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The recent human impact on the environment is so unique in the geological record that the 
official geological body that defines the division of geological time, the International 
Commission on Stratigraphy, is considering designating a new geographical epoch called the 
Anthropocene, calling attention to the global impacts humans, and particularly the human 
economy, are having on the Earth’s biological, atmospheric and geological systems. Using the 
example of climate change, it is argued below that the magnitude, suddenness, and long-term 
consequences of the current human abuse of the natural world calls for a radical new approach to 
valuing nature, one based not on individual choice in the immediate present but rather on a 
socially embedded “deeper sense of time”. Such an approach would move beyond attempts to 
“correctly price” nature based on imputed market values and would instead rely on shared social 
values and a concern for future generations. These shared social values can be made concrete 
through discursive processes drawing upon our long evolutionary history of collectively solving 
the problem of intergenerational sustainability.    
Keywords: Anthropocene, climate change, deliberative valuation, discounting, neuroeconomics, 
social choice 
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 “Human activity is set to leave an indelible mark on the geological record. 
Deforestation, mining and road building have unleashed tides of sediment down 
rivers and onto the ocean floor. Fossil-fuel use and land clearance have already 
emitted perhaps a quarter as much carbon into the atmosphere as was released during 
one of the greatest planetary crises of the past, the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal 
Maximum 55 million years ago. Now, as then, corals and other organisms are 
recording a global carbon-isotope shift. The increasing acidification of the oceans as 
they absorb carbon dioxide will dissolve carbonate from deep sediments, and what is 
likely to be the sixth great mass extinction in earth’s history will gather speed, 
adding vivid new markers to the record.” (Nature 473, 254, editorial, May 19, 2011) 
 
I. Introduction 
The recent human impact on the environment is so unique in the geological record that 
the official geological body that defines the division of geological time, the International 
                                                           
1 The author would like to thank Jack Hanich and Lisi Krall for helpful comments on an earlier 
draft. Parts of this article were adopted from Gowdy (2008, 2010a) and Gowdy, Howarth and 
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Commission on Stratigraphy, is considering designating a new geographical epoch called the 
Anthropocene (Jones 2011, 133). This will call attention to the global impacts humans, and 
particularly the human economy, are having on the Earth’s biological, atmospheric and 
geological systems. The driving force behind previous major geological transitions has been 
natural processes like meteor impacts, massive volcanic activity and continental shifts. As the 
quote above shows, the current human perturbation of the global environment will have an 
impact of similar magnitude (Nature 2011).  Yet most people are unconcerned about the looming 
possibility of environmental devastation and the resulting social chaos in the years to come. 
What is it about our way of living and associated ways of thinking that puts so little value on the 
future of the planet? A major reason is the narrow logic of the global market economy which 
values nature solely on its contribution to the discounted present value of economic activity. 
Following the logic of the market, the dominant economic model views the natural world from a 
financial investment perspective. Using the example of climate change, it is argued below that 
the magnitude, suddenness, and long-term consequences of the current human abuse of the 
natural world calls for a radical new approach to valuing nature, one based not on individual 
choice in the immediate present but rather on a socially embedded “deeper sense of time” (Wing 
2011). Such an approach would move beyond attempts to “correctly price” nature based on 
imputed market values and would instead rely on shared social values and a concern for future 
generations. These shared social values can be made concrete through discursive processes 
drawing upon our long evolutionary history of collectively solving the problem of 
intergenerational sustainability.    
One of the most dramatic indicators of the Anthropocene is the increase in greenhouse 
gases over the past few decades. Over the past 800,000 years atmospheric concentrations of CO2 4 
 
 
varied between 180ppm and 280ppm (Lüthi et al. 2008). CO2 levels during this period are tightly 
correlated with temperatures and sea levels. These 50ppm fluctuations around the average of 
230ppm were enough to push the earth between warm periods comparable to today’s climate to 
extremely cold ice age conditions. In May 2011 atmospheric CO2 levels at Mauna Loa, Hawaii 
passed 394ppm, an increase approaching 100ppm since the middle of the twentieth century (the 
Mauna Loa data is available at ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_mm_mlo.txt). When 
CO2 levels were this high in the past the Earth’s climate was dramatically different than today’s. 
Tripati, Roberts and Eagle (2009) report that during the Middle Miocene, some 10-14 million 
years ago, CO2 levels were slightly lower than today’s (around 350ppm) but temperatures were 
3C to 6C warmer and sea levels were 25 to 40 meters higher. Further back in time, around 56 
million years ago, the Earth experienced the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) 
when temperatures rose by 8C. The PETM was probably triggered by volcanic activity which 
caused a release of CO2 and frozen methane (Kump 2011, 58-59). The estimated release of 
greenhouse gases (5000 petagrams) then was about the same as the total projected release due to 
human activity in the industrial era. But the PETM event took about 20,000 and the rate of 
heating was estimated to be .025C per 100 years compared to the projected rate of 1-4C per 100 
years over the next few centuries. After the PETM episode it took the Earth about 200,000 years 
to recover. (Kump 2011). If past climate regimes are approximate indicators of what we can 
expect in the future, large, abrupt, and unpredictable changes will occur for centuries to come. 
In spite of international efforts to curb greenhouse gases, CO2 emissions have grown at 
an annual rate of 3% per year since 2000, compared to 1.1% per year in the decade of the 1990s 
(Raupach et al. 2007) and reached record levels in 2010 (go.nature.com/rtgd7f). In view of the 
magnitude of emission increases, and the inertia of the world’s economic and political systems, 5 
 
 
the chances of limiting the CO2 level to one consistent with the Holocene’s stable climate regime 
are bleak. By some estimates CO2 levels could reach 2000 ppm within a few centuries if the 
readily available coal, petroleum and natural gas are burned (Kump 2002). Kasting (1998) 
believes that the most likely scenario is that atmospheric CO2 will peak at about 1200 ppm 
sometime in the next century. A climate-carbon model developed by Bala et al. (2005) has the 
business-as-usual CO2 peak occurring around the year 2300 at 1400 ppm. Emissions scenarios by 
the IPCC include a worst case, carbon intensive scenario projecting a level of 1370 ppm by 2100 
(Kintisch 2008). Obviously, if CO2 levels reach these extremes, abrupt and catastrophic climate 
events are likely.
2 The scientific consensus is that delaying substantial emission reductions for 
even a few more years may be disastrous (Jaeger, Schnellnhuber and Brovkin 2008).  
The growing seriousness of the climate change threat and the release of the Stern Review 
(Stern 2007) of the economics of climate change led to a vigorous debate among economists as 
the merits and limitations of the standard economic model
3 used to value nature. This on-going 
debate has done much to illuminate the assumptions of the standard economic model and their 
consequences for estimating the costs and benefits of climate change policies. At first the Stern 
debate centered primarily on the “proper” discount rate to apply to future costs and benefits of 
climate change mitigation (Ackerman 2008, Dasgupta 2006, Mendelson 2006, Yohe and Tol 
2007). As the debate progressed it became clear that there was more to the economics of climate 
change than choosing the “correct” discount rate. Several prominent environmental economists 
                                                           
2 A recent re-examination of “hothouse earth” climate regimes indicates that CO2 levels during 
these periods were around 1000ppm, not 3,000-4,000ppm as previously thought (Newton 2010). 
 
3 By standard economics I mean the Walrasian general equilibrium model also called the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), the New Welfare Economics, or simply 
neoclassical economics.   
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came to the conclusion that the standard model offers an inadequate framework to analyze 
environmental issues characterized by irreversibilities, large uncertainties, and very long time 
horizons (Gowdy and Juliá 2010, Quiggin 2008, Weitzman 2009).  The “key messages” in the 
Stern Review (Stern 2007, Chapter 2, p. 25) make it clear that standard economic analysis 
embodies assumptions that make its application to climate change problematic: (1) climate 
change is a global phenomenon with global consequences, (2) its impacts are long-term and 
irreversible, (3) pure uncertainty is pervasive, (4) changes are non-marginal and non-linear, and 
(5) questions of inter- and intra-generational equity are central.   
The latest views of leading environmental economists suggest that a profound 
reformulation of the economic valuation of the natural world is needed. Regarding the human 
impact on nature, we are in uncharted waters where the costs of mitigation may be large but the 
cost of inaction is potentially infinite, namely the extinction of our species and a catastrophic 
reorganization of the earth’s climate and biosphere. Marginal analysis of near-to-equilibrium 
changes in market activity is a woefully inadequate approach to address a problem of the 
magnitude of today’s massive reorganization of the Earth’s climate and biosphere.  
  One positive development during the last few decades is the recognition of the global 
impacts of Homo sapiens on the Earth’s biophysical systems and the danger these impacts pose 
to the viability of our species. Another positive development is the recognition of the extent to 
which human nature and human institutions, as well our physical characteristics, have been 
shaped by the forces of natural selection. Our “social brain” (Frith and Frith 2010) evolved in 
part to give humans the ability to change customs and technology to adapt to a quickly changing 
resource base compared to other animals that depended on more purely genetic adaptation. 
Richerson and Boyd (2005) argue that culture and complex brains were an evolutionary 7 
 
 
advantage for humans during the extreme climate volatility of past ice age transitions. The ability 
to use culture as an adaptive mechanism creates another source of variety—in addition to 
genes—upon which Darwinian selection can work. The ability of humans to adapt material 
culture, value systems, and behavior associated with these values, to changing conditions offers 
some hope in successfully managing the coming environmental transition. Judging from 
historical records of hunting and gathering societies (Gowdy 1998) and behavioral and 
neurological evidence, for most of our evolutionary history our value systems placed much more 
emphasis on the social good and much less on individual-based materialism. Understanding the 
uniqueness (among mammals at least) of the degree of sociality among humans may hold the key 
to moving toward a sustainable way of living on our finite planet. Successful policies will require 
an evolutionary perspective on valuing the natural world, one that goes beyond proximate causes 
of resource use (prices and markets) to examine ultimate causes (institutional responses to 
resource availability and biophysical constraints and opportunities).
4   
II. Truly Social Choice: The Missing Perspective in Economic Valuation   
The climate change debate has forced economists to re-think the market-based approach 
to valuing the natural world (Ackerman 2008, DeCanio 2003, Nelson 2011, Spash 2002, 
                                                           
4 The distinction between ultimate and proximate causation (Tinbergen 1963) stresses the need 
for two separate and complementary explanations for all products of genetic and cultural 
evolution. Ultimate causation explains why a given trait exists, compared to many other traits 
that could exist, based largely on the winnowing action of selection. Proximate causation 
explains how the trait exists in a mechanistic sense. Excessive amounts of CO2 are being pumped 
into the atmosphere because prices are too low (proximate cause) but more importantly because 
of the way industrial capitalism evolved in terms of production techniques dependent on fossil 
fuels, the concentration of economic and political power, and the culture of consumption 
(ultimate causes). It is especially important to recognize the many-to-one relationship between 
proximate and ultimate causation, whereby many functionally equivalent solutions can evolve in 
response to a given environmental challenge. Failing to distinguish between design features and 
specific implementation of design features can result in the inability to detect correlations and 




Weitzman 2009). The economic model is a financial investment model designed to show how a 
perfectly rational individual should allocate resources so as to maximize the discounted flow of 
income evaluated at a particular point in time (Gowdy 2010b). The basic inadequacies of the 
standard economic approach include the failure to address the existence of pure uncertainty, 
threshold effects, incommensurability of values, and non-substitution. These shortcomings have 
been widely discussed and will not be dealt with here with one exception, namely, the reliance of 
standard economic valuation on the assumption of individual, self-referential behaviour.
5 The 
economic model values future states of the environment using a so-called social discount rate. 
But this discount rate is merely the individual discount rate adjusted for external effects (Krall 
and Gowdy 2011). The future is valued from the perspective of an isolated individual at a 
specific point in time. The “social good” is simply the sum of the well-being of self-regarding 
individuals. Valuation decisions are stripped of their social context.  
In contrast to the economic model, recent evidence from such diverse fields as 
anthropology, behavioural science, psychology, and neuroscience has established that humans 
are unique among mammals as to their degree of sociality (Chapais 2011, Hill et al. 2011, 
Wexler 2006). This research may point the way toward more effective environmental policy 
design. Dealing with climate change will require cooperation on an unprecedented scale. It is 
encouraging that the evolutionary success of our species is based on our ability to manage scarce 
resources through cooperation and collective valuation of the future consequences of our actions 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005, Sober and Wilson 1998). Before getting to the details of these new 
                                                           
5 The term “self-referential” is critical. The standard model assumes that behavior is not 
influenced by the behavior of others, one's social position in relation to others around us, or 
cultural norms. The standard economic assumption of self-regarding behaviour strips away 




findings about human sociality it is useful to briefly review the standard economic approach to 
valuing the future.   
In the standard economic model future monetary costs and benefits are converted into 
"present values" by discounting them at the rate r defined by the so-called Ramsey equation:  
(1)  r  =   ρ + η •  g                                                                                                                               
The discount rate r is determined by the rate of pure time preference (ρ), the elasticity of 
consumption η, and the rate of growth of per capita consumption (g). In intuitive terms, 
individuals discount future economic benefits: (1) because they are impatient, and (2) because 
they have a declining marginal utility of money—since income and consumption levels are 
expected to rise, one additional unit of future consumption will provide less satisfaction than one 
additional unit of consumption today.  
The Ramsey equation and the interpretation of its parameters show the unresolved 
tension between private and social valuation. The discounting debate between Stern and his 
critics has centered on the term ρ, the rate of pure time preference. Nordhaus (2007) for example, 
uses a relatively high value for ρ while Stern uses a value near zero. Stern’s argument for this is 
clear and convincing from a social point of view, namely that the well-being of someone born in 
the future should not count less than that of someone born today. For Stern the choice of ρ is a 
social and ethical one, for Nordhaus it is a private investment decision. If the perspective is that 
of a self-referential individual at a point in time then ρ is positive—I care only about the lower 
value to me of something I get in the future as compared to having it now. If the perspective is 
that of the well-being of human society then there is no reason to count the utility of one 10 
 
 
generation more than that of another so ρ should be near zero.
6 Likewise the second term ηg may 
also be given a private or social interpretation. The elasticity of substitution η is usually given a 
value of 1 so that a 10% increase in income is given the same weight no matter what the absolute 
magnitude (see the discussion of the political economy of the use of this term in Stanton 2011). 
The value of g answers the question “how well off will future generations be?” In the standard 
model g is a private investment concept, the growth of per capita income, and is usually assumed 
to be the growth rate of income over the past 100 years or so (as in both the Stern and Nordhaus 
models). The values of g in the Stern report and in the most widely used climate change models 
range between 1.5% and 2.0% (see the discussion in Quiggin 2008). Assuming rapid economic 
growth will continue, discounting today’s negative impact on those in the future is justified by 
the assumption that those living in the future will be better off than those living today (Pearce, 
Atkinson and Mourato 2006). The use of average income as a universal welfare measure allows 
economists to sidestep questions about substitutability, irreversibility, quality of life, relative 
income and many other issues plaguing the standard model.  By contrast, using well-being or 
quality of life estimates of g would highlight the negative consequences of market-induced 
environmental changes and the social responsibility of those in the present for those in the future. 
In spite of heroic attempts to include social values in the discount rate, reducing 
environmental policy to choosing the "correct" discount rate reduces an intergenerational and 
social problem to one of individual choice at a point in time. Economic estimates of 
                                                           
6  Geogescu-Roegen (1974, 32) called for a zero discount rate for using irreplaceable resources 
or causing irreducible pollution.  He argued further that: “The only way to protect future 
generations, at least from the excessive consumption of resources during the present bonanza, is 
by reeducating ourselves so as to feel some sympathy for our future fellow humans in the same 





environmental values assume that people care only about absolute income not their income 
relative to others. By contrast, experimental results show that economic behavior is based on 
preferences that depend on the relationship of the evaluator to others. This has been 
demonstrated in thousands of behavioral, game theoretic and neurological experiments (Gintis 
2000). Other relevant valuation considerations include inequality aversion, pure altruism, spiteful 
or envious preferences and altruistic punishment (Fehr and Fischbacker 2002). Recent research 
results from experimental economics, behavioral psychology and decision theory have the 
potential to make economic analysis and policy recommendations more reflective of actual 
human decision-making but contemporary environmental economics largely ignores these recent 
theoretical and empirical advances (Knetch 2005).  
As society considers how to motivate humans to address the challenges of global 
environmental change, increasing attention is turning to psychological and biological insights 
into human behavior. Current research in behavioral science and neuroscience is confirming 
what critics of standard economic theory have long argued:  humans are highly social mammals 
whose behavior deviates significantly from strict “rationality” because of social norms and 
evolutionary history. Our species has survived because we have evolved biological features 
(including brain structure) and institutional arrangements that promote cooperation. Behavioral 
insights have been slow to penetrate the economic policy world, but these insights may help 
shape more effective policy approaches to redirecting individual and system behavior.    
III. Valuation and the Deep Social Structure of Humankind      
New findings about human behavior and the deep social structure of the human species 
have important implications for the valuation of nature and the formulation of environmental 
policies, particularly policies having very long-run impacts such as climate change and 12 
 
 
biodiversity loss. Behavioral economics is still a new field but it has already challenged standard 
theory, and standard valuation practices, as much as any theoretical revolution since the 1930s. 
For improving valuation techniques the most important contribution of behavioral economics 
and neuroscience has been to establish that human behavior is social. Humans make decisions 
not only as individuals addressing immediate individual problems but also as members of groups 
with highly evolved institutions to insure cohesion and the long-run stability of the group.  
 
The Deep Social Structure of Human Society 
Primates are exceptional in their degree of sociality but scientists are just beginning to 
discover the uniqueness of human sociality. For example, to a degree not seen in other primates, 
humans are able to form long-term cooperative bonds with non-kin. Hill et al. (2011) looked at 
co-residence patterns in 32 present day foraging societies and found that humans, compared to 
other primates, are unique in that (1) either sex may remain with their parental group, (2) adult 
brothers and sister may co-reside and (3) most members of a residential group are unrelated, (4) 
preferential bonds are maintained with spouses’ relatives and relatives spouses. Generally, 
primary kin make up only 10% of a residential band.  In other primate groups most members are 
closely related. Thus human cooperation cannot be explained entirely by kin selection (Trivers 
1971) or inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964). Commenting on the Hill et al. study, Chapais (2011, 
1277) writes: 
 Cooperation in other primates is limited to the coordination of individuals belonging 
to the same group. The advent of the primitive tribe moved cooperation to substantially 
higher levels of complexity. It paved the way for the coordination of whole social groups, 
hence creating the nested character of human social structure.  
Evidence suggests the existence of a kind of collective intelligence of human groups 
related to group composition but unrelated to the characteristics of individuals within the groups.  13 
 
 
In a recent study of group decision making, Woolley et al. (2010) found evidence for what they 
called a “collective intelligence factor.”  In two different studies, groups of two to five people 
were assigned a variety of tasks then the groups were ranked according to their performance of 
these tasks. The authors found that a collective intelligence factor explained the groups’ 
performance and that:  
The “c-factor” is not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual 
intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group 
members, the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of 
females in the group.  (Woolley et al., 2010, 686) 
 
This research is still in its infancy but it seems to corroborate theories that humans 
evolved deep social, non-kin bonds as a way to adapt to environmental change. It suggests that a 
case can be made for valuation processes allowing for interaction and deliberation. Such 
deliberation can capture information and deal with uncertainty in ways that isolated individuals 
cannot. There may also be an “ideal” composition of groups for making critical decisions. For 
example, is there an ideal mix of selfish individuals and altruists in collective decision making? 
What role does gender play in successful group composition? Does voting based on isolated 
individual decisions preclude solutions based on group deliberative valuation that might result in 
better outcomes? Many mammals are highly social animals with a variety of behavioral 
attributes that evolved to facilitate social interaction, but humans seem to be unique in their 
degree of sociability. Evidence for the existence of the social brain (Fehr 2009, Frith and Frith 
2010, Singer 2009) suggests the need for a theory of valuation and decision making that is 
deliberate, other regarding, and consistent with human sociality.  
The Neuroscience of the Social Brain      
The uniqueness and importance of human sociality has been confirmed and enriched by 
neuroscience. The way the brain is organized and develops provides strong evidence for the 14 
 
 
evolutionary importance of human sociality. Most of the neurons in the human brain develop 
after birth and the way they are configured depends critically on how a child is socialized. It is 
another way that variability can be introduced into evolutionary mix. Wexler (2006, 3) writes 
about the evolutionary advantages of brain plasticity: 
[T]he distinctive postnatal shaping of each individual’s brain function through 
interaction with other people, and through his or her own mix of sensory inputs, creates an 
endless variety of individuals with different functional characteristics. This broadens the 
range of adaptive and problem-solving capabilities well beyond the variability achieved by 
sexual reproduction.   
 
Another finding from neuroscience is the presence in the human brain of Von Economo 
neurons. These specialized neurons, also called spindle neurons, apparently evolved to enable 
people to make rapid decisions in social context (Allman, McLaughlin and Hakeem 2005, 370, 
Sherwood, Subiaul, and Zadwidski 2008, 433). Deficiencies in the number of these neurons 
have been implicated in diseases affecting social interactions like autism and Alzheimer’s. 
These neurons are also found in a few other species—great apes, elephants, and whales and 
dolphins—although in much smaller numbers
7. These other species are highly intelligent with 
complex social systems (Semendeferi et al., 2010). In humans, about 85% of Von Economo 
neurons are formed after birth. This again points to the blurred line between heredity and 
socialization. Sherwood, Subiaul, and Zadwidski (2008, 433) write: 
It is interesting that these specialized projection neuron types have been identified 
in cortical areas that are positioned at the interface between emotional and cognitive 
processing. Given their characteristics, it has been speculated that Von Economo neurons 
are designed for quick signaling of an appropriate response in the context of social 
ambiguity (Allman et al. 2005). Enhancements of this ability would be particularly 
important in the context of fission-fusion communities, such as those of panids 
                                                           
7 An intriguing exception was found in an autopsy of the lowland gorilla Michael. Michael lived 
in a rich social environment interacting with humans and was a companion of Koko, another 
gorilla who taught him sign language (Patterson and Gordon 2002).  Michael was found to have 
considerably more VENs than other gorillas autopsied, approaching the lower end of the human 




[chimpanzees and bonobos] and possibly the LCA [last common ancestor], with complex 
networks of social interactions and potential uncertainties at reunions. 
 
A fission-fusion community is a kind of social group where the members gather together 
in one locality to sleep, but split into smaller groups to forage. Among human hunter-
gatherers—a type of society that characterized most of human existence—fusing and splitting 
can be seasonal, with small bands being the group type for most of the year but coming together 
to form a larger group when resource availability permits (Gowdy 1998). In this kind of social 
organization groups are continually changing in composition and Allman, McLaughlin and 
Hakeem (2005, 370) argue that Von Economo neurons help humans to adjust quickly to rapidly 
changing social situations: 
We hypothesize that the VENs and associated circuitry enable us to reduce 
complex social and cultural dimensions of decision-making into a single dimension that 
facilitates the rapid execution of decisions. Other animals are not encumbered by such 
elaborate social and cultural contingencies to their decision-making and thus do not require 
such a system for rapid intuitive choice. 
 
        Neurological evidence confirms the uniqueness of the degree of sociality in humans. The 
success of our species (so far) may be largely the result of our ability to cooperate and to harness 
the advantages of collective decision-making. This is in sharp contrast to the economic view of 
the sanctity of individualistic rational choice and it has important implications for climate change 
and other environmental policies affecting the future of our species.  
Whatever the recent successes of civil society organizations in helping to address such 
challenges, it seems that current responses are incommensurate with the scale of the problems we 
confront. It is increasingly evident that resistance to action on these challenges will only be 
overcome through engagement with the cultural values that underpin this resistance.  
A report published by the UK World Wildlife Fund (Crompton 2010) argues that current 
approaches to solving global challenges are failing because they do not engage with cultural 16 
 
 
values. It seems clear that, in trying to meet these challenges, civil society organizations must 
champion some long-held (but insufficiently esteemed) values, while seeking to diminish the 
primacy of many values which are now prominent – at least in Western industrialized society 
(Crompton 2010, 5). These values include the importance of family and social relationships, 
concern for future generations, and empathy toward others. These values are particularly 
important in addressing “bigger-than-self” problems—problems important to individuals but 
whose solution is unlikely to be justified by self-interest alone. “Immediate-self-interest” 
problems, by contrast, are those whose solutions are justified in terms of personal gains alone. 
Related to this is the distinction between intrinsic values and extrinsic values (see Sheldon and 
McGregor 2000). Intrinsic values are those that do not depend on competitive comparisons with 
others—a sense of community, enjoyment of friends and family, and self-actualization. Extrinsic 
values relate to things that have zero-sum comparisons, like material wealth and power. 
Advocates of aggressive climate change policies may have missed the boat by focusing 
exclusively on extrinsic motivations.  
IV. Harnessing Human Sociality: Environmental Governance through Deliberative 
Valuation  
  Evidence from behavioral and neuroscience evidence suggests that the degree of human 
sociality is unique. We apparently evolved to make critical decisions in social settings, not as 
isolated individuals. Understanding the social nature of decision making may be a key both to 
formulating successful social and environmental policies and to gain public acceptance of these 
policies. The human species has been so successful precisely because we have created elaborate 
social institutions to decide the common good (Richerson and Boyd 2005, Sober and Wilson 
1998).  But concern for the common good has been eroded by economic theories and public 17 
 
 
policies increasingly focused on the individual, not the good of the group. The contrast between 
standard economic theory and behavioral economics is mirrored in the conflict between 
neoliberal democracy and deliberative democracy (Quiggin 2010).   
Neo-Liberal Democracy – This governance model is consistent with the “isolated selfish 
individual” underlying the standard economic valuation of nature. This valuation framework has 
been consciously used to discourage public support for any sort of cooperative, collective public 
policy, the very kinds of policies that are critical for addressing climate change. “Social choice” 
is simply the sum of choices made by individuals who are “free to choose” in private markets. 
The value of nature is determined by the ability of ecosystem services to contribute to economic 
output. This is the economic view of “weak sustainability” – sustainability as non-declining GDP 
(Gowdy 2000).  
Over the past few decades the dictates of the market has come to dominate the valuation 
discussion.  Bromley (2007, 677) describes the takeover of reasoned public discourse and 
democratically chosen public policies by the let-the-market-decide mentality:  
Suddenly, it seems that public policy is not what we thought it was. Democracy as 
public participation and reasoned discourse is somehow suspect—not to be trusted. It 
seems that the public’s business cannot be properly conducted unless it adheres to the 
precepts of individualistic models of “rational choice” applied to collective action. … It is 
a quest for public policy in which applied micro-economics is deployed as the only way to 
impose “rationality” on an otherwise incoherent and quite untrustworthy political process. 
This is not a clash of worldviews. It is a clash of contending truth claims about how to 
figure out what is to be done in the public sphere—it is a confrontation between 
prescriptive consequentialism and reasoned public debate over how to get to the future. 
 
The neoliberal public policy prescription is to set markets in motion and then let 
efficiency in allocation determine the socially optimal outcome. In terms of the valuation of 
nature, this prescription requires only that prices be “correct” and that property rights are fully 
specified. Moreover, it moves “democracy” from “one person, one vote” to “one dollar, one 18 
 
 
vote”.  And as this happens social stability and environmental sustainability are eroded in the 
name of efficiency and economic growth.    
But human sociality offers a way out of the straightjacket of individual-based valuation. 
Human society is more than a collection of isolated individuals acting only in their narrowly 
defined self-interest. Bromley (2007) argues that since future generations cannot express their 
preferences to us we have a duty to act as Regents on their behalf. We have a responsibility to 
protect the economic, biophysical, and social conditions that will allow them to achieve their 
aspirations even though we have no way of knowing what these aspirations are. The question 
then becomes not how much to preserve but rather what to preserve. An alternative global 
governance model consistent with the behavioral and neurological evidence about human 
sociality and cooperation is one based on deliberative discourse.  
Global Governance through Deliberative Discourse – Deliberative discourse recognizes that 
there is more to democracy than individuals voting.  Dryzek and Stevenson (2011) sketch out 
some essential features of a global deliberative governance framework. These include 
empowered space, transmission, accountability and meta-deliberation.  It is hard to envision 
exactly what a global deliberative discourse environmental authority would look like. But this 
emerging framework for earth systems governance is consistent with the view of human nature 
as outlined in the behavioral and neuroscience literature. Deliberative valuation served our 
species well for 100,000 years or more. A global governing body to regulate our use of nature 
seems to run counter to the anti-government reaction now prevalent in Western democracies. But 
it is a mistake to see the widespread distrust of governments as a rejection of collective action 
based on democratic deliberative discourse.  19 
 
 
Behavioral studies can give some clues about governance structures that facilitate 
cooperation. The most cooperative societies are those that have the most efficient mechanisms 
for punishing free riders (Henrich et al. 2006). People are more likely to accept decisions they do 
not agree with if the deliberative process is perceived to be fair. Group decisions lead to better 
outcomes if the composition of the group is balanced in terms of gender and personality types 
(Woolley et al. 2010). Deliberative discourse is consistent with behavioral science in that it 
recognizes that reasoned judgment is not something undertaken by a lone organism in isolation 
(Nelson 2011).  
Does deliberative discourse lead to the sustainable use of nature? Dryzek and Stevenson 
(2011) give several examples of successful consensual systems that might be a model for a 
global agency. Norway, for example, has integrated social and environmental movements and 
has had some success in moving toward environment-friendly economic policies. Deliberative 
polls held in Texas led to greater investment in renewable energy and conservation policies 
(Fishkin 2009).  Focusing public policy on well-being rather than exclusively on per capita 
income may also have positive consequences for the environment. Rangel (2003) argues that 
providing social goods like health care, job security, and a minimum income, may play a crucial 
role in sustaining investment in “forward intergenerational goods” such as environmental 
preservation. Focusing policies on subjective indicators of happiness, rather than on per capita 
income, would pay a double dividend. People would be happier and also more willing to support 
polices promoting environmental sustainability. To fully develop a viable alternative to the 
neoclassical notion of sustainability, scientific measures of the factors contributing to human 
well-being are needed as well as indicators of the physical and biological requirements for long-
term human survival. 20 
 
 
 V.  Summary and Conclusions  
To summarize the above discussion, the current reorganization of the Earth’s life support 
systems is almost unprecedented in its magnitude and speed of occurrence. A major threat to the 
viability of the human species is rising temperatures due to the buildup of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere. Polices to address this problem have focused on correcting market 
“externalities” using individual-based incentives and they have been ineffective—CO2  and other 
greenhouse gas emissions continue to grow exponentially. It is argued above that environmental 
policy formulation should embrace our basic nature as social animals concerned with the good of 
the group. Current research has confirmed that humans are almost unique in their degree of 
sociality and this may be the primary reason humans have been so evolutionarily successful to 
this point. The question today is whether or not we can harness our cooperative nature on global 
scale to meet the unprecedented challenges we face. Our success depends on how we value the 
natural world and how we construct institutions articulate our social values. 
It is encouraging to note that humans lived sustainably as hunter-gatherers within the 
confines of local ecosystems for 95 per cent of our existence as a species. We survived by 
creating institutions that served the well-being of the group as well as the individual.  For a 
variety of reasons, including tapping into the stock of the earth’s stored carbon energy, we broke 
out of those local confines. We now find ourselves once again coming up against biophysical 
limitations, this time imposed by the entire finite planet (Eldredge 1995). We may be able to 
escape this dilemma by drawing on the unique social characteristics that define our species, the 
ability to cooperate and the ability to construct social, technological and economic systems in 
harmony with the biophysical systems that sustain us. But this will require expanding the notion 21 
 
 
of the “group” to include the entire human species. In the words of Georgescu-Roegen (2011, 
102): 
A new ethics is what the world needs most. If our values are right, everything 
else—prices, production, distribution and even pollution—has to be right. At first man has 
heeded (at least in a large measure) the commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” a little later 
“Love thy neighbour as thyself.” The commandment of this era is “Love thy species as 
thyself.”  





Ackerman, F. (2008), The new climate economics: The Stern Review versus its critics. In 
Twenty-First Century Macroeconomics: Responding to the Climate Challenge. Eds. J.M. Harris 
and N.R. Goodwin, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham,UK.  
 
Allman, J., McLaughlin, T., & Hakeem, A. (2005), ‘Intuition and autism: a possible role for Von 
Economo neurons’ Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 367-373. 
 
Allman, J., N. Tetreault, A. Hakeem, K. Manaye, K. Semendeferi, J. Erwin, S. Park, V. Goubert, 
and P. Hof (2010), ‘The von Economo neurons in frontoinsular and anterior cingulated cortex in 
great apes and humans’ Brain Structure & Function, 214, 495-517. 
Bala, G., K. Caldeira, A. Mirin, M. Wickett, and C. Delire (2005), ‘Multicentury changes in 
global  climate  and  carbon  cycle:  Results  from  a  coupled  climate  and  carbon  cycle  model’, 
Journal of Climate, 18, 4531-4544. 
 
Bromley, D. (2007), ‘Environmental regulations and the problem of sustainability: Moving 
beyond “market failure”’ Ecological Economics, 63, 676-683.      
 
Chapais, B. (2011), ‘The deep social structure of humankind’, Science, 331, 1276-1277. 
 
Crompton, T. (2010), Common Cause: The  Case for Working with our Cultural Values. World 
Wildlife Fund UK. Available at http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/common_cause_report.pdf 
(accessed August 31, 2011). 
 
Dasgupta, P. (2006), ‘Commentary: The Stern Review’s economics of climate change’, National 
Institute Economic Review, 119, 4-7. 
 
DeCanio. S. (2003), Economic Models of Climate Change: A Critique, Palgrave Macmillan: 
New York.  
 
Dryzek, J. And H. Stevenson (2011), ‘Global Democracy and Earth System Governance’ 
Ecological Economics, in press. 
 
Eldredge, N. (1995), Dominion, University of California Press: Berkeley.  
 
Fehr, E. (2009),  ‘Social preferences and the brain’ In Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and 
the Brain. (pp. 215-232), P. Glimscher, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, & R. Poldrack (Eds.) Academic 
Press: London. 
 
Fehr, E., and U. Fischbacher (2002), ‘Why social preferences matter – The impact of non-selfish 
motives on competition, cooperation and incentives’, Economic Journal, 112, C1-C33. 
 
Fishkin, J. (2009), When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation, 




Frith, U. and C. Frith (2010), ‘The social brain: allowing humans to boldly go where no other 
species has been’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 365, 165-175.  
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1974), Energy and economic myths. Reprinted in Energy and Economic 
Myths, 1976, San Francisco: Pergamon Press, 3-36. 
 
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (2011), ‘The steady state and ecological salvation’ In From Bioeconomics 
to Degrowth: Georgewscu-Roegen’s New Economics in Eight Essays, edited by Mauro Bonaiuti, 
Routledge: Oxon, UK and New York.  
 
Gintis, H., (2000), ‘Beyond Homo economicus: Evidence from experimental economics’, 
Ecological Economics, 35, 311-322. 
 
Gowdy, J. (1998), Limited Wants, Unlimited Means: A Reader on Hunter-Gatherer Economics 
and the Environment, Island Press: Washington, DC. 
 
Gowdy, J. (2000), ‘Terms and Concepts in Ecological Economics’, Wildlife Society Bulletin, 28, 
26-33. 
 
Gowdy, J. (2008), ‘Behavioral economics and climate change policy’, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 68, 632-644.   
 
Gowdy, J. (2010), ‘Behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and climate change policy’, 
Baseline Review for the Garrison Institute Initiative on Climate Change Leadership, Garrison, 
New York. 
 
Gowdy, J. (2010), Microeconomic Theory Old and New: A Student’s Guide. Stanford University 
Press: Stanford, CA. 
 
Gowdy, J., R. Howarth, and C. Tisdell (2010), Discounting, ethics, and options for  
 maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem services. Chapter Six in The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic  Foundations.  Pushpam Kumar (Ed.). An output of 
TEEB: The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity. Earthscan: London, 257-283.  
 
Gowdy, J. and R. Juliá (2010), ‘Global warming economics in the long run’, Land Economics, 
86, 117-130.  
 
Habermas, J. (1996), Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
Hamilton, W. D. (1964), ‘The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II’, Journal of 
Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–16, and 17-52. 
 
Henrich, J., R. McElreath, A. Barr, J. Ensminger, C. Barrett, A. Bolyanatz, J. Cardenas, M. 
Gurven, E. Gwako, N. Henrich, C. Lesorogol, F. Marlowe, D. Tracer, and J. Ziker (2006), 




Hill, K., R. Walker, M. Božičević, J. Elder, T. Headland, B. Hewlett, M. Hurtado, F. Marlowe, P. 
Wiessner, B. Wood (2011), ‘Co-residence patterns in hunter-gatherer societies show unique 
human social structure’ Science, 331, 1286. 
 
Jaeger, C., H. Schellnhuber and V. Brovkin (2008), ‘Stern’s Review and Adam’s fallacy’, 
Climatic Change, 89, 207-218. 
 
Jones, N. (2011), ‘Human influence comes of age’, Nature, 473, 133. 
Kasting, J. (1998), ‘The carbon cycle, climate, and the long-term effects of fossil fuel burning’, 
Consequences, 4, 15-27. 
 
Kintisch, E. (2008), ‘IPCC tunes up for its next report aiming for better, timely results’, Science, 
320, 300. 
 
Knetch, J. (2005), ‘Gains, losses, and the US-EPA Economic Analyses Guidelines: A hazardous 
product?’ Environmental & Resource Economics, 32, 91-112.  
 
Krall, L. and J. Gowdy (2011), ‘A reconstruction of natural capital’,   In Toward an Integrated  
Paradigm in Heterodox Economics – Alternative Approaches to the Current Eco-Social  
Crises. Rolf Steppacher and Julien-François Gerber (Eds.) Palgrave-Macmillan: London.  
 
          Kump, L. (2002), ‘Reducing uncertainty about carbon dioxide as a climate driver’, Nature, 419, 
188-190. 
 
Kump, L. (2011), ‘The last great global warming’ Scientific American, 305, 57-61.  
 
Lüthi, D. et al. (2008), ‘High resolution carbon dioxide concentration record 650,000-800,000 
years before present’, Nature, 453, 379-382. 
 
Mendelsohn, R. (2006), ‘A critique of the Stern Report’, Regulation, 29, 42-46. 
 
Nature editorial. (2011), ‘The human epoch’, Nature, 473, 254. 
 
Nelson, J. (2011), ‘Ethics and the economist: What climate change demands of us’, Ecological 
Economics,  in press. 
Newton, A. (2010), Insights from earth. Nature reports Climate Change, 4 (February). 
www.nature.com/reports/climatechange. 
 
Nordhaus, W. (2007), ‘A review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45, 686-702.  
 
Nowak, M. (2011), Super Cooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to 




Patterson, F. and W. Gordon (2002), ‘Twenty-seven years of project Koko and Michael’ In B. 
Galdikas, N. Briggs, L. Sheeran, G. Shapiro, and J. Goodall (Eds.) All Apes Great and Small, 
vol. 1, Kluwer: Amsterdam and New York. 
 
Pearce, D. G. Atkinson, and S. Mourato (2006), ‘Cost benefit analysis and the environment: 
recent developments’, OECD Publishing: Paris. 
 
Quiggin, J. (2008) ‘Stern and the critics on discounting and climate change: an editorial essay’.  
Climatic Change,  89, 195-205. 
 
Quiggin, J. (2010), Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Rangel, A. (2003), Forward and backward generational goods: Why is social security good for 
the environment? American Economic Review 93, 813-834. 
 
Raupach, M., G. Marland, P. Ciais, C. Le Quéré, J. Canadell, G. Klepper, and C. Field (2007), 
Global and Regional Drivers of Accelerating CO2 Emissions. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104, 10288-93. 
Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Semendeferi, K., Teffer, K., Buxhoeveden, D., Park, M., Bludau, S., Armunts, K., Travis, K., &. 
Buckwalter. J. (2010), ‘Spatial organization of neurons in the frontal pole sets humans apart from 
great apes’ Cerebral Cortex, 20, 1485-1497.  
 
Sen, A. (2003) ‘Why democratization is not the same as Westernization: Democracy and its 
global roots’ New Republic, 4 October. 
Sheldon, K. and H. McGregor ( 2000),  Extrinsic value orientation and “the tragedy of the 
commons’ Journal of Personality, 68, 383-411. 
 
Sherwood, C., F. Subiaul and T. Zadiszki (2008) ‘A natural history of the human mind: tracing 
evolutionary changes in brain and cognition’, Journal of Anatomy, 212, 426-454. 
 
Singer, T. (2009), ‘Understanding others: Brain mechanisms of theory of mind and empathy’ In 
Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. In P. Glimscher, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, & R. 
Poldrack (Eds.) Academic Press: London, pp. 251-268.  
 
Sober, E. and Wilson, D. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish 
Behavior.  Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Spash, C. (2002), Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics. Routledge: London. 
 
Stanton, E. (2011), ‘Negishi welfare weights in integrated assessment models: the mathematics 
of global inequality’, Climatic Change DOI: 10.1007/s10584-010-9967-6 (accessed 19Jun11). 
Sterman, J. (2000), Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, 
McGraw Hill, Boston.  26 
 
 
Stern, N. (2007), The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, UK. 
Tinbergen, N. (1963) ‘On aims and methods in ethology’, Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie, 20, 
410–433. 
Tripati, A. C. Roberts, and R. Eagle (2009), ‘Coupling of CO2 and ice sheet stability over major 
climate transitions of the last 20 million years’, Science, 326, 1394-1397.  
 
Trivers, R. (1971) ‘The evolution of reciprocal altruism’, Quarterly Review of Biology 46, 35–
57. 
 
Weitzman, M. (2009), ‘On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate 
change’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, XCI, 1-19. 
 
Wexler, B. E. (2006), Brain and Culture. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
Wilson, D.S. and J. Gowdy (2010), ‘The relevance of evolutionary science for economic theory 
and policy’, White paper for NSF SBE Program Initiative “Framing Research for 2020 and 
Beyond”. Available at http://evolution-institute.org/files/NSF-EvoEco-White-Paper.pdf 
 
Wing, S. (2011), ‘We need a deeper sense of time’, Science, 333, 825.  
 
Woolley, A., C. Chabris, A. Pentland, M. Hashmi, and T. Malone (2010), ‘Evidence for a 
collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups’, Science, 330, 686-688. 
 
Yohe, G. and R. Tol (2007), The Stern Review: Implications for climate change. Environment, 
49-42.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 